Episode 118: Basil of Caesarea Against Eunomius Books 2 and 3

We are back with our old format in this episode. Tom, Trevor, and Chad discuss Basil of Caesarea's Against Eunomius Books 2 and 3. The conversation centers on how to speak about God given what we know from scripture. It is a conversation that includes philosophy of naming and language broadly. This touches on some of the most foundational issues in theology, how does one speak about God at all. Hope you enjoy this episode.

Timestamps:

4:54- Holy Spirit

7:54- The Philosophy of Naming

41:11- Analogical Tradition

Episode Transcription

Charles Kim 0:00

Hello, and welcome to history of Christian theology. My name is Chad Kim, with me this week will be Tom Velasco and Trevor Adams, we will be discussing basil assessories against you know me as books two and three. So this conversation will primarily focus on how basil says Maria has a has a, you know, is writing against this guy called, you know Meeus, who has certain views about how one talks about God, and how one knows the things to say about God. And so this is a pretty dense conversation about theological language and biblical interpretation. But I think it's very helpful to understanding how Christians think and speak about the divine. If you have questions about this every semester, I teach CS Lewis's Mere Christianity at St. Louis University. And in book four of Mere Christianity, he has a really good introduction to Christian theology on the Creed's, and especially like the difference between begotten versus created and these sorts of things. So I recommend that to you. I also wanted to thank Julianne Seward and Wisco Matt, two recent comments that were given to us on Facebook or on Apple's podcast app. And they say, Julianne says that this is this podcast is helping her redeem her education. She's a homeschool mom who came to faith as an adult. And she's been covering church history. And every time she has a question, she says that we always have an episode to talk about it. So I wanted to say thank you to Julianne, also, Wisco. Matt says, Thank you for the interviews and thought provoking theologians and historians. He says that he's experienced a 21st century church that is floating and disconnected from its own history. And so he's always grateful to remit but to be reminded that it's a 2000 year conversation. So thank you, Wisco. Matt, we had to have a few conversations coming up with Dr. Jonathan Tran, Asian Americans in the spirit of racial capitalism, as well as a listener, Hannah nation, and her upcoming book on Chinese house churches. So we're going to kind of go in some slightly different directions than we have in the past, but but I think these conversations will be fruitful. If you have any interest in supporting us, you could check out our Patreon, just go to patreon.com and search for a history of Christian theology. And you will find us there. If every listener gave $1, we'd have more than enough to cover our costs. So thank you for listening. And without further ado, the conversation with basil says Surya and the against eunomia, books two and three, we are trying to finish up basil accessory as a country, you know me and against, you know, me, us. And he, we talked about the father, mostly God, the Father, and the first part, and this part, we're going to talk about God the Son, and then he has a short little Kota on the spirit. And so as as always, Todd likes to point out, the church fathers know that they have to say something about the spirit. And actually, Basil is on the spirit, what, four years ago, who knows, we read it.

Tom Velasco 3:03

It's like one of the main I'm sure we did. It's one

Charles Kim 3:06

of the main works that we have on the spirit up to this point in Christian history, but you know, me is is I mean, I find you know, me it's kind of interesting. In this section, I mean, you know, he's, he's like, but he's tried to argue in a sense that we should talk about God the Father as the and begotten and God the Son as the only begotten. And he his main argument so far as I can tell, for you know, Vyas Ed, he's kind of in the line of areas. And actually, that's what basil charges him with, which becomes a sort of standard theological tick. Later on. Basically, if you don't like someone, you thought you'd connect them to a heresy, and Aryan is a big one for the next 100 years or so. And then sometimes later, we'll just sort of say, Hey, you're kind of like this person. So you're an Aryan. But you know, he is thinks that the name only begotten says something about God's God, the father's substance or sorry, I'm begotten says something about God, the Father substance substance only begotten says something about the sun's substance. And he thinks that this is really important because it essentially tells us something real about what's going on in the Godhead. And but but for basil, this creek creates two distinct unity or two distinct entities. The father, and then the son and theirs have separate substances. And this is, of course, what the Council of Nicaea, which was written before this treatise, is trying to protect against Homosassa of one being and that's kind of that's kind of your battle as far as I see it. Do you guys want to take issue with how I set us up?

Tom Velasco 4:54

No, no, I one thing I do want to kind of just join in. It's kind of back to one of the Earlier things you said about how the church always ignores the Holy Spirit. And I'm sure this has come up in a previous episode. But for all of our listeners out there, I have no idea what we said three years ago. So forgive me if we rehash, rehash old pattern. But don't forget that the original Nicene Creed at the end, it said, we also believe in the Holy Spirit. And that was how it ended. They later on amended that and added other bits, but it was 381. Yeah, believe in the Holy Spirit, the original one, back in 325, of the Council of Nicaea. They had nothing to say and actually. And this will obviously get later, I'm just bringing it up now. Because you pointed out that you know me as has kind of cast in Aryan terms, which is totally correct. But he does go, he veers away from areas on the Holy Spirit in calling the Holy Spirit a created being, which is very different from how areas and even that basil kind of points that out. He's like, he's like, you're you're literally coming up with something nobody has ever said. Which is kind of kind of funny. But other than that, no, there was some clever arguments in this paper, I thought. And Trevor it in my mind, it went right down your alley, because it was all definitional. And everything he was doing was based on which if I'm not mistaken chat, and this is for again, those listening at home. We first got basil to discuss what, a year ago?

Charles Kim 6:47

I mean, it's been a while. Yeah.

Tom Velasco 6:49

I mean, I just got a message from somebody today actually asking, you know, basically saying so, you know, why aren't you and Trevor, regular guests on the show anymore? He's said, Well, it's I didn't respond, actually, I probably will. But the real issue is we just have been busy and haven't been doing it. So we're getting the work. Chad's giving us the work. And we're not doing at least I'm not I can't speak for Trevor. But we got this like a year ago. So but unless I'm mistaken, the reason why we picked this overall, was to give our analytic philosopher or resident, Trevor something to kind of munch on because that's right. That's right. He likes definitions. And this thing is full of them. Well, in particular

Trevor Adams 7:38

naming which, and theories and names. And yeah, this, that was the passage I highlighted. Do you want to talk about that now? Yeah, let's

Charles Kim 7:49

go. Because, uh, yeah, I have some thoughts as well about the underlying Greek but go ahead.

Trevor Adams 7:54

Okay. So yeah, which I would actually like to know, sort of, you know, what it really says in the original language, but 135 was a passage I highlighted there's, it's right at the top. It's, for as soon as we hear the sound of this designation, this designation being a name. We immediately think, and I think this one, what actually should go back which name is Peter, right? So it's like so as soon as we hear Peter right, we this is the quote, we immediately think of the son of Jonah, the man from Bethsaida, the brother of Andrew, the man from the Stata, the brother of Andrew, these are definite descriptions, as we call them, though one summon from fishermen to the ministry of the apostle vo one, who, because of the superiority of faith was charged with the building up of the church, none of these as his substance understood as subsistence subsistence, which I take to mean something like Peter could exist without any of those definite descriptions being true. Hence, the name determines for us the character of Peter cannot ever communicate the substance itself. This is very weird. So this is like predating like a lot of arguments that happen in contemporary analytic philosophy. Like, first of all, there's a way in which it's affirming Bertrand Russell's theory of names, right? So Bertrand Russell thinks that names are disguise definite descriptions. And he did this because it's really easy to put into what we call predicate logic or quantifier logic, right? So it's super easy to just put like, there exists a symbol there exists an x such that x bla bla bla bla bla, and you could just fill it out. It's like all these things that are in the definite description. And thus, anything that fulfills the definite description. Basically gets this end existential Lee quantified statement in logic and there you go. And that's all the name is. So whenever whenever we say the name, we can replace it with that. And then we can reason as follows. And there's a way in which he's saying that that's the case. But then he's, he's like then hitting on this later point that like crypkey came along. And this was like cookies big contribution is like, Yeah, but then you're not going to pick out the the very thing. Yeah. Now, I'm not I don't think he's quite saying the same thing as cookie because crypto, he was concerned that you're actually picking out that instance of that thing. So Peter is a human. When eunomia says it doesn't pick up the substance, I think he means something like it's not picking out literally, the fact that Peters human at all or something like that. I'm not I'm not quite sure I want to hear your thoughts. Whereas what crypto is concerned with is the you could go you know, things were different. Some of these definite descriptions could be false. For example, He could have not been the one who because of the superior face was charged with building up the church. However, our name Peter would still pick that very individual so that very, you might say, token instance of a human out, but it wouldn't pick out like the human part. I'm not really sure exactly what he affirmed, because of course, he's not trying to give us a treaties on names here. He's just trying to use this for the argument. But this it was very interesting. And it made me think that if this is really is the word, like if this is actually supposed to be a

Charles Kim 11:52

definite article,

Trevor Adams 11:53

yeah, definite article, sorry, I was like article or an article I just said definite description yet it didn't come to my brain. If this really is supposed to be a definite article, then yeah, this is a way that this is a kind of interesting, philosophical, historical point, that sort of, maybe this has been the common sense view of names, and that people have been analyzing names this way, for a long time, way before Russell and his fancy logic. Yeah.

Charles Kim 12:24

Well, so I had a version of this pulled up, but it appears not to be the same version. So I was actually looking to see what Marco cogliano The guy who made this translation, I was trying to pull up, who, which critical addition he was using. But so in order to be able to tell you exactly what the underlying language is, but the Yeah, so there, I mean, there are a couple of different things to say about like how language works for them, and sort of how naming work. So like, there is a kind of like, the catalyst from Plato is one of the places where a lot of people go to talk about how Plato understood names, and what are commonly and even how whether or not language picks something out directly, it seems like the stoics had a sort of more fixed definition of how language pick something out. And so you know, so like, it corresponded to a mental representation, which had a certain connection to the thing itself. And so you had, you know, your, your it sort of, in this trickly, in strictly speaking philosophy of language. It wasn't the kind of Vic and Justinian definition that we used earlier of usage, it was like it was more directly tied to the instance of the thing that's being described. And so there's kind of like that really fixed kind of language. But what I take basil to be actually arguing for is something like, well, it just sort of depends on how you're using it. And these are kind of more fluid. And it depends on which context, and you know, grouping a bunch of different things together. So he then goes on to talk about Jonah, and a few other names, and different ways to describe the same person. And so it's sort of like saying, well, and he and he realized it on what we would call rhetorical theory of homonyms. And so that in rhetoric, right, you can, you can talk about one thing in a couple different ways. And that doesn't mean you're changing the thing that you're talking about. You just have different ways to describe the same thing. And in that case, there isn't only one word or one name that best picks out the individual. But there's just a whole bunch of things that you could pick out the same thing. And so whether or not you're Trevor or whether or not you're Trevor Adams, or what Whether or not you're Trevor Adams, the philosopher, or you know, the husband of so and so all of those are our sort of mer I can't remember her full name, Meredith. Whether or not you're the husband of Meredith, all these other things, these are interesting descriptors, but all they are is descriptors. And a name just fits in the class of description, not something that picks out your individual substance.

Trevor Adams 15:26

Yeah. So because that's the argument as I see it, he's going through, he's admitting that the names in his his words, so signify these distinguishing marks, which is these definite descriptions, basically, but then says cannot ever signify the substance or the material substrate? So his then argument is, yeah, sure. All these things are encompassed by the single term, Paul, right. That's a direct quote. And it's just all these different descriptions about Paul. But his that yeah, then his argument is it's, it's better to just quote him, all these things are certain. Moreover, if it were true that the substances of those things whose names differ are opposed and Paul and Peter and all people in general must be a different substance. So basically, just because I can pick out different distinguishing marks that are encompassed by a name, it would be silly to then reason that the various substances are different. And that's why I think what I was saying earlier, I think when he says that he's not picking at Christie's point. He's talking about like the universal and you know, if you want to get into the metaphysics for any metaphysics people out there, it's almost like he's talking about the universal substance that they they both hold. No Name picks that out, apparently, however. In crypt use terminology, I guess he's trying to talk about the token instantiation of a universal or, in other words, a particular human, in which case, I would argue a name certainly picks out a particular human right, like, all those definite descriptions would be false. Of, or you would not be talking about Peter, if those definite descriptions were true of something that wasn't human. At least that's my intuition.

Charles Kim 17:23

Like, I see. Yeah,

Tom Velasco 17:25

I don't think he necessarily disagrees with that. Trevor, I could be wrong on that. But I think I the way I read him on that is he's saying the name Peter does pick out, the combination of all those definite descriptions, with the name Peter doesn't do is say anything about the substance of the being Peter, that is what makes him Peter. And this is important, because it at least it seems to me what he's arguing against eunomia is, is you know, me, as is arguing, that only begotten is is the name of Jesus are of the sun, and is the only proper name of the sun. And it's proper, because it calls out the substance. And he uses this to make a whole bunch of different arguments. The first, of course, is to point out well, that's absurd, because being only begotten is this, what was the phrase he used, again, distinctive mark, or whatever English to Mark, this is a distinguished mark of Jesus, he says it's not his substance. And he illustrates this by saying there are other only begotten ones. And if all only if only begotten, was a name that picked out the substance, then Jesus would actually or I should say, the son, or the second person in the Trinity, would actually be of the exact same substance as all other only begotten, you know, and so he's basically saying, look, a name doesn't relate to the substance, it calls out all of these different features. And then he goes on to basically make the argument that only begotten fails even as a name, because it was never used in Scripture. Like there are other names for Jesus or for the Son in Scripture. And he basically says, why not use the ones God himself appointed?

Trevor Adams 19:22

Yeah, well, and I take that point. And I think I take the more general point that something like just because two names signify different definite descriptions so father would signify different ones and the son or something like that. You certainly cannot then reason to they must share a different substance. Look at Peter and Paul, that's sort of the argument like oh, look, here's an example where they differ but but you can I just quibbling with like, I can certainly reason to what your substance might be depending on the definite descriptions like I would argue the brother of Andrew makes me go Hmm, well, I know Andrew is the human And, and to be a brother means to be related. So are you know the man from? I mean, that one just says it though man from Bethsaida it's like, oh, so I mean, like so sighs if all definite descriptions, then a namesake that a name, what's the exact word or encompasses don't give you clues or entail a substance for the individual I mean, so if if you think that son does that in the Only Begotten or something that you maybe, but the but I still yeah but I take the general point that just because there's different

Tom Velasco 20:41

I agree with you, Trevor, I think he would say no, he would say son does call out characteristics of the second person of the Trinity as would only be gotten this what he's arguing isn't that those call out characters don't call up characteristics? Because they certainly do. He pointed out that that the case of only begotten This is a relational characteristic, but it's still a characteristic. What he's denying is what eunomia is at least in his in his understanding of him is doing is eunomia is giving that as the essence like this is a full description of what he is.

Trevor Adams 21:19

Yeah, it's certainly you know, me as his argument is certainly invalid however, I yeah, it's just there could be a valid version. You to tweak it, but yeah, in this case, it's certainly about

Tom Velasco 21:31

because well, this is if he's if he's representing you know me as correctly there, that it actually seems to be kind of a it'd be kind of hard for me to imagine that you know, me is actually means that that the only qualities that all essential qualities that that the Lord has are being only be the only begotten You know what I mean? Like that's, that would actually be hard for me to imagine. But But insofar as basil describes this view, that's what it seems like he's doing.

Charles Kim 22:05

So I mean, just as a sort of text critical point. There are times when so Mark duck Gagliano is the scholar who did this underlying tax. There's another guy like vuggy own is his last name, who reconstructed what he thinks to be, you know, me as his original treatise. So Doug Gagliano compares vog piano to what he thinks, you know, Miss actually says, and there are occasional points were dark, where cogliano will note where we think that basil is embellishing on what you know, Miss actually said, and this actually isn't one of those cases. So I mean, as best evidence we have, this is likely what you know me is actually thought. And so I think that so the reason to sort of maybe make, you know, obvious his point a little differently, so why should we think that this particular name actually named the substance of the thing and this kind of peculiar way that Tom was just describing, there's something about the fact that it is the Holy Scriptures, right, so what we're going to go on to find is that these are the holy oracles of the Spirit. And so when there are names that are given, you know, me as thinks that they have a sort of peculiar power to name some kind of substance and a more definite way that we normally use the language. So I think like the the way to be kind of the most generous towards you know, me as is to say, like he thinks he's actually picking these out of Scripture, in a very definitive kind of way that is binding on the Christian, regardless of how we normally think about names and naming and all these other things, like he's being a kind of literalist and saying, These are the Holy Spirit's words for these designations. So we need to kind of use them as they're given.

Tom Velasco 24:00

Yeah, I think that's I mean, that would like as like I said, it's always hard for me to tell with this because I haven't read you know, me as it's there's so many things to read in the world, that I find myself not necessarily wanting to read a bunch of the heretics but at the same time, I feel like if we actually read the heretics, we'd probably be better equipped to, I don't know, engage in the conversation a little bit. Insofar as the heretics writings even survive, right? I mean, they're, you know, one of the big things about the heretics is their, their writings go away. But one thing that made me wonder, and this, it's a similar topic, but it appears way later in the paper. And so I don't know if it's relevant to these particular claims, but I'm on page Dan, page, what pages this 168 So it's a ways down. Basil gives two quotes From eunomia says that appear to be contradictory. The first one says, Let no one be disturbed when he hears that the sun is something made, as if a common substance were construed for them by the commonality of the names. And then the second quote, if in fact, these people had any concern for truth, they should confess, confess that when names are different, the substances are also different. So here, he shows a contradiction, apparently, in your Nahmias in which, you know, me as in the one instance seems to be saying that the name does indeed, equal equate the the essence. And then the other one, he seems to say the opposite, he seems to say that you can have you can have different names correlated to the same essences, and so on and so forth. And I don't know what to make of that. I mean, you know, me as or basil makes the point that, you know, I mean, this is crazy, and, and an idiot, and all that kind of stuff that he can't even think clearly. I just wonder if there isn't more there that we just don't know about? Because I have to assume if you know, me, as a wide enough audience, that people are reading him and baths, people like basil, and Gregory of Nyssa need to engage with him, that he must have some competence to be able to speak to people.

Charles Kim 26:24

Yeah, well, and one, one point about what you just use there, just for what it's worth, the underlying Greek here, as always, for names is onomah, on Omata. And then substances who see. And so it's exactly the terms that are contested from the Council of Nicaea. And then sort of confirmed and 381 at Cal Seaton, or, excuse me, Constantinople. And so that is the underlying word, or the other line words, the other sort of interesting thing and all of this, in Greek, the word for name and the word for noun are the same. So there's no there's no sense of proper name, that's distinguished from sort of a noun in general. So you know, so it's hard to tell linguistically, when you're talking about the man or a man. And, Trevor, because you work in English, we'll talk about it as a proper noun, and, or a name. And then we'll talk about the noun, man. But in Greek, it's just Oh, my alma mater. And so it seems like there's like sort of linguistic confusion. Like we make this really important class distinction of a name, a title or something. Title is the close that you title is, is is also a word in Greek where it's a little closer to something like what we mean by name. But But still, the there's enough over semantic overlap in our word name, because like, when you introduce yourself in Greek, you say, oh, Ma, a mu, cotta loose. St. You know, you just use that word, the name that my name is, and that says, it's all about you could translate that as the noun of me is Chad money. Yeah. Well, anyway, so that's sort of it's it's an interesting part of what's going on. It's because they're trying to you know, they're kind of playing on this. Well, ambiguity,

Trevor Adams 28:37

huh? Okay. Yeah, that, but that makes sense, too, because then when he talks about, he talks about other names, and he says stuff like human being is name and horse and hawks. And he's trying to get, he's trying to make a distinction between those and other things. Other I guess, names like son, slave friend, and trying to show that one's relational, the others not. And I was like, oh, okay, so yeah, we're using name and a pretty loose way here. But I guess a lot of the reasoning will go through in very similar ways. I mean, in fact, I guess crypkey Probably one of the most famous applications of CryptoKeys theory on names is to like natural kinds like water. So it's not as if it's a crazy thing to do. But yeah, but that that makes sense then, that maybe, yeah, maybe they've sort of got it all as one concept rather than rather than sort of two very distinct concepts that do two different logical things. Which by the way, the passage I just brought up, is on. It's 142. It's like 78 page 79 of our PDF. I, I thought this was interesting as well, because this goes to our current discussion. And this is I think kind of what we're talking about in our back and forth as well, Tom. So he says, it's the second paragraph that starts off with who does not know. So I might as well just read it. So who does not know that some names are expressed Absolutely, and in respect of themselves, signifying the things which are their reference, but other names are said relative to others expressing only the relation to other names, relative to which they're said for example, human being, human being in quotes, horse, goats, and ox each communicate the very thing that is named, but sons, slaves and friend reveal only the connection with the associated name. So When anyone hears something begotten, he has not brought in his mind to a certain substance, but rather he understands it's connected with another for that, which is something he gotten is said to be something begotten of someone else. So yeah, so I'm reading this and I'm going, Okay, this is cool. In fact, this is kind of cookie esque. Which by the way, crypkey is really just as a million theory, John Stuart Mill that is, so anyway, if you want your historical lineage share, as I go, okay, that's, that's neat. But then when he moves to this, like what we just talked about, like son, slave and friend, okay, yes, slave and friend. Sure. But son, when he when he reasons from sun does not bring to mind a certain substance, it's just that I just I'm like, Well, no, now it gets, I think you I think this gets basals results still, so it doesn't like ruin Bezos argument or anything. But it's just a quibble, though. It's like, well, no, yeah, if I hear sun, sure it's a relational. But given what I know about how that works, I do assume so. Like, if I heard like, so was like, you know, Fido has a son and I Oh, Fido is a dog, I'm going to assume son of Fido is a dog like it certainly brings to mind a substance. So which would get basil? His result? Right? Because then it would be at the same substance with father. So. But it that was weird to say that because it he's saying it in a very, it's a very strong thing to say like it just does not? It does not. So When anyone hears something begotten, he has not brought in his mind to a certain substance, like, really, what if I change it? So I am bringing brought to mind certain substance?

Tom Velasco 32:44

I have read that I did read that differently? Because I again, I think, like, I don't know, I mean, and this, I could just be wrong on this. I don't know that basil is saying that a name doesn't bring out because part of this is definitional about substance, right. So when I think of substance, I think of characteristics. And I think particularly essential characteristics, so characteristics that a thing has to have to be what it is. And I can think of sonship at not not talking about the Father and the Son. But talking about just like the notion of sonship as being a relational, a relational characteristic. I have it only insofar as I have this certain relation to somebody else. And I could see somebody saying, in some sense that that doesn't qualify as a kind of essential characteristic. But I don't know even that basil is saying that, that these relational characteristics are never essential. I don't know that basil would say that the Jesus being the Son or being only begotten isn't essential to him. I think he would I think he would say that, but I think what he instead is saying is that doesn't encompass the entirety of his essence. That's not the whole of it. And it's not uniquely his because other things are also only begotten. And so if we make that all that he is, then he shares purely the same essence as any other thing that is an only begotten, and he's saying that that's wrong, and that's kind of how I've taken it. And he then goes on, like, like you pointed out just a second ago, Trevor, one of his key points that he's going against eunomia is with is the begotten this actually goes to his point to his own view, because on his view, the begotten this implies a sharing of substance that is that whatever the Father is, the son is going to be that, that that just like what you just said, like a father. You know, like Rufus the dog or whatever, yeah, son is going to be that. And so he's saying, Look, I I do think Jesus is begotten I do think he has these characteristics, but that begotten this set means something and what it means is that the the substance of the Father is in the substance of the Son, whereas you he would say to eunomia who are saying that this is the sum total of your essence is that your begotten as opposed to an begotten, like, like the father, that means, you have totally different essences, and it cannot be communicated. In fact, he's saying logically the father can't even be get you just exist as a only begotten with no father because the father can't be

Charles Kim 35:42

good. Yeah. So this is

Trevor Adams 35:44

okay, this this was like our discussion last time when? Okay, yeah. All right. You know what this is people this is it's been this many weeks since we've recorded the first one. So I've already forgotten about book one. I remember this now this weird talk about a name like being like basically like a hard court plate NIST. Reasoning here, and Okay, so now now I'm realizing the issue when he's so in this passage is, quote, When anyone hears something begotten, he is not brought in his mind to a certain substance. My objection is, of course I am the whatever the thing you're begotten of substance. But what he means is like, literally, that something begotten This is a substance. Yeah. Which would be like, absolutely. So see, my mind is so not Platanus I'm so like, Aristotelian that I just am like, what is crazy?

Tom Velasco 36:42

Well, this, this definition, this is why I've struggled thinking this is what you know, me, it's actually meant, because actually holding that view seems bonkers,

Trevor Adams 36:53

right? Because then like, yes, certainly, my my dog and the Son of God have the same. You know, I have the same parent, of course, yeah, I can. Beatles be me being begotten. We all there's lots of things that would like participate in that forum, so to speak. So yeah, that's really

Charles Kim 37:15

well. So one thing that I wanted to bring up that's related to this, but takes it to another sort of level, I guess. It's on page 153. But it's, it's sort of like, okay, how far do these analogies go? So how far can we use the notion of fatherhood and son hood to describe what basil will call actual theology? That is God in say, God and God's self, the imminent Trinity versus God in for us, the in the economy of salvation? So what can we say about God and God's self? And he says, at the top of one of the three, no one should quibble over our account here, if none of the examples harmonized completely, with the matter at hand. So that is, the father and the son distinction can help us think about sharing a substance and beginning, but it's not perfect. That is, it doesn't explain to us everything about what's going on in the Divine Trinity. So far, and then he says, for trivial and insignificant things cannot be adapted Exactly. To divine and eternal realities. So there's sort of a sense in which we can have this conversation. And we can learn things by these analogies, but there will always be insufficient. And but then it's sort of funny. They are used only insofar as they refute the false pretenses. So they're, so they're sort of as good as they can be to refute. But what's interesting is this actually, it comes close to a kind of Dionysian apophatic ism. That is there useful to say what it is not, but they're actually not perfect about telling you what is and you're sort of already seeing the seeds of and the grounds for so the pseudo Dionysius or Dionysius, we haven't read yet. the Areopagus, but he has this like, he's kind of the original apophatic theology theologian who says that you can't speak about what God is you can only speak about what God is not is sort of what he's known for. Now. complicated than that. Yeah, well, we should yeah, I'm down. But you can see how basil gets there. Or excuse me, you can see how Dionysius gets there. So Dionysius knows pretty well, the cabin oceans and origin and sort of takes them another step further. But this so but what the real point that the point that I wanted to really kind of drill down on that we haven't really talked about at all, is the question of, what does it mean to speak up have God in an analogical sense? So like, I'm realizing very quickly, the more that I studied theology, and it's kind of come to a head in the last year is the greatest question is, how do how do we make human language predicates something of divinity? And and so to what extent is that connected to our natural realities? And to what extent is it totally obliterated by revelatory categories? So the like, and this is going to get into a lot of modern theology. But but most Barton's want to say that we can't analogize from what we know on Earth to to the divine. And so this is sort of cutting the legs off of natural theology. And so the the 20th century German bar tn kind of Neo orthodox school, they want to undo any any kind of connection between language that we have, which is based upon our natural realities, and what we can speak about God, and say that the only things that we can say about God come from Revelation.

And this this sort of fascinating move, and it's, but it is the question because you want to say like, Well, yeah, like, and what, what, what can we say? Because if we could say nothing, that it doesn't seem like our language is meaningful at all, in any grand sense. And so you, you totally understand why Aquinas and then those people who take the Thomistic position, what to say, well, we have to be able to say something, and analogy matters to some degree. Otherwise, like, we're just we're all just playing, you know, I'm not even sure we're communicating. We're certainly not communicating with God, or communicating about God. And if that's the fundamental reality, then what is the point of our talking? And that and that seems to be like basil is saying, like, you know, he's he's, he's not saying and that but here's, here's the kind of so what is, you know, me as saying, I think you know, me as is talking about you to velocity of speech, which is apparently done the SCOTUS his position, which I know almost nothing about, but he thinks that we can speak you know, vocally about God, so that there is no ambiguity in some sense. Like, it's just direct application, and Aquinas wants there to be an analogy was, so as a is to b. So C is to D, it's not direct speech. And then the bar t is the other direction. Let's just obliterate it all. And I think you know, me this is actually arguing for something more like a univocal speech with respect to God.

Trevor Adams 42:44

Hmm, so Okay, yeah, in which case, oh, wait, you said, you know, oh, you know, me as favorite. Right. So, so that basil is sort of anticipating Aquinas? Yes. You know,

Charles Kim 42:58

that's what I think's going on. Yeah. And I think the sort of broader tradition really wants this kind of analogy to work so we can dance carefully around certain things. But we're never speaking univocally about God that I think SCOTUS wants to do. And then yeah, then, you know, whatever you want to make of the party and move is a whole other thing. But it's like, every time it sort of baffles me that that's what I think the bar to move is. And it's it's a kind of an if David Bentley, Hart is correct. It's just an extension of what Calvin wants to say your language is meaningless. And and so, you know, why are we talking about good and evil if those terms are totally arbitrary? But yeah,

Trevor Adams 43:44

yeah, I've noticed that people Sorry, I'll like I'll just say this real quick. I've noticed that people if they're like, yeah, if they if they really know this theology, whatever, they'll be super strict about this. But in like real life. Most Christians I've actually interacted with I've noticed that it's a sliding scale somewhere between Barton ism and Aquinas is view depending on whether it's an issue they agree with or disagree with, right? So if it's something you really don't want God to have a property really don't like about God, you just go all the way down to Martinez. As people start to affirm things that sound Barkin, whereas if it's like, or maybe they'll literally slide the scale that way. And then if it's something they really want a property they really want God to have, though. They'll slide a lot closer to clients, but I've never I've definitely don't meet Christians. I'm sure there are some and I bet you've maybe you've met them, and just at least can't remember people who think well, you know, now I say that there's probably some people but the univocal view that does seem like the craziest in some way. It seemed like a lot of people I met if they if they've reflected on the Bible at all, at least a little bit, they would say things like, well, of course, you know, these are human thoughts and his thoughts are higher than our thoughts. And they would, you know, His ways are not our way. And they would say stuff like that to say like, you know, it's just an analogy Christ is like adore Christ is you know, and I had heard that repeated so much when I was a kid. So EDW, which is more acquainted ish, in its Thomistic, you might say, but

Tom Velasco 45:27

yeah, I think I mean that you mentioned in this idea that you know, me, this is univocal it, I mean, I could be totally off base here, but what it makes me think of, is, it makes me think of what Pascal derives as the God of the philosophers. It's the whole, you know, late Renaissance, early enlightenment era, starting with Descartes going to Spinoza, especially Spinoza, where you have this idea that you can give these rigid definitions. And by giving these rigid definitions, you can deduce reality, you can, you can eliminate ambiguity, and you can eliminate a vagueness and come to a concrete understanding of what is really real, in a sense, it's like, like, like, we want certainty, and we want want absolute certainty. And we want no, like, emotive component or anything like that. And that seems to be what a lot of the Enlightenment philosophers are doing. And in some sense, I think a lot of analytic philosophy is carried that over it just that it seems to be the analytic philosophy. Kind of, I mean, I'm probably oversimplifying here, and you can definitely correct me on this Trevor, if you want. But I feel like a lot of it is like, Okay, we acknowledge that that univocal thing is not really real and true. Spinoza was off Hegel was off. You can't deduce reality in this precise, like, way, like propositional, but there are things we can, and we're just gonna focus on those things. And we're going to barely kind of traverse the other stuff and let science and other disciplines kind of deal be the experts on that front. I could be wrong on that. But that was my impression when I was studying philosophy was that analytic philosophy was like, they were picking up where the Enlightenment left off, in that they were saying, We too want to focus on what we can know for certain for the most part, and what we can reduce to kind of, like, the least ambiguous kind of modes of discourse, but we acknowledge this other stuff is out there. That was kind of highlight how I interpreted it. And whereas, you know, one of the things I do think is interesting, I mean, whether it's Thomistic, or whatever, it does strike me that this is kind of core to the Judeo Christian, that I should let me put it this way that ANA analogical, thinking thinking by analogy, is core to the Judeo Christian project, right? I mean, we're created in God's image, according to Genesis, and that the implication is we can learn about God, because in some salient ways, we're like him. Because we've been made in His image. And then of course, in John one, one, in the beginning was the Word the Word was with God, the Word was God. I think the implication, amongst other things is this the language and the ability to communicate and reason is our unique gift as humanity. And that's kind of the unique way in which we're like God, and he chooses to reveal Himself to us through the Word. And I'm not I don't mean it in the bargain sense of like, only the Scripture, I'm not necessarily committed entirely, although I like a lot of what Bart is doing there. And I do think the principal way we learn about him is through revelation in Scripture. I do think it's more, I think it's more broadly, the word like the fact that we can talk the way that we can, and think the way that we can, and we do that enables us to think about God, in spite of the fact that in lots of ways we can't I do think acknowledge that we can't know Him fully. Because how does the finite know the infinite? You know what I mean? Like, I think it's only through this more analogical way.

Charles Kim 49:25

Well, and yeah, I think that's well said. It's, I mean, yeah, and just to reiterate for listeners, you know, one way this really drives hard into this conversation is Basil will say, he essentially says in the passage, just before I've just quoted, he says, Well, what are you going to do when it says God is a rock, or I save them with right hand? And he says, we don't just assume by that, that God has a body of or that God is a rock and that so that's where the idea of analogy comes in. Is we have to say, Okay, well what are you to do about those passages in the Old Testament where or in the New Testament or whatever, where God is anthropomorphized. We don't we don't, strictly speaking, believe that God has an arm. What I think is fascinating though, is there is actually a movement in Biblical studies to do this. And it's sort of like Biblical Studies, people are kind of in that sort of univocal mode, and they want to just continue on and this sort of rationalistic project and say, Well, if it speaks about God having a body, then God must have a body of, and they don't want to annul the Gize that speech. And I analogize excuse me that speech. And I like I just heard, I've been, I don't know if anybody's still listening at this point. But I mean, there's a book on script, Britney Wilson, I mean, she is a New Testament scholar who says, well, we shouldn't talk about God, we should talk about God's body. And we should mean it in some sort of univocal way, like God has a body and it's our body. And there's no analogy. And I'm like, wait, what?

Tom Velasco 51:08

I mean, yeah, that that seems crazy to me, honestly. I mean, I don't know. And that's a move. Yeah, yeah. I mean, that that actually this inability to think analogical I mean, you're thinking in terms of academics, which I didn't I when I said, I don't know, a second ago, I was thinking of something very different. Because it would seem odd to me that academically people would go that route at the, like, street level, lots of people go that route, right. I mean, you know, this is a these are conversations I have ad nauseam with people where you try to, I don't know, I mean, especially just given evangelicalism, and its obsession with eschatology, that's like, that would be an example where trying to sit down with people and to say, look, some of this language may not be literal, it's just a will not compute. Like, these are things that must be done. Exactly, literally. And then of course, just as a side note, I mean, they then proceed to not be literal, right? I mean, it's kind of an inconsistency, because they'll turn around and they'll say something like this. Well, the the Beast of Revelation is clearly the Antichrist. And I go, Okay, well, what is that? They go, what's a man? I'm like, well, then you're being non literal. Because it's a beast. Like, well, yeah, I mean, you know, so they'll cry out for this extreme, literal illness. But the beast is a man, am I right? No, that's, that's not anyway, that's neither here nor there. My point is, is that kind of at the street level, people are, they try very hard, to be literal to to a fault. And it makes it impossible to, to read the language or to make sense of the language, you have to go in saying, everything is not everything. I need to be careful here. I mean, there's an analogy is essential to understanding scripture, I have to be careful. I believe that there are many things in the Bible that are meant to just be stated as a historical fact. But that my point is, is that is that nonetheless, by the Bible uses is replete with this analogical language, and requires us to understand analogical language, by the way, it's not just the Bible, it's human talk requires it. We're, again, constantly we're using metaphor and comparison and things in our discussions and in our processing of life. So it's just what it means to be human.

Trevor Adams 53:51

Yeah, I mean, insofar as you're it talking about the Bible generally is probably a bit different from speaking about specific passages in which you're attributing properties of God. Right. And, yeah, you're right. I, there is a tendency for sure to try to be the least especially in church, I grew up in the same church, you go to now. Huge tendency to try to be as literal as possible whenever you could. But I did find that a lot of people were, I don't know, I, I'd be curious to know, because I'm sure you've interacted with a lot more people. My memory is that lots of people were very comfortable when it came to actually attributing things of God to do it in a very analogical way. That's when all of a sudden because of their sort of some sort of like, deference to the God's glory that Oh, of course, we can't say this literally of God, then all of a sudden it's super easy to not be literal.

Tom Velasco 54:50

Yeah, you're definitely right that people are more comfortable. Using analogy to speak of God overall. At have, you know, in my experience with with churchgoers, for sure, there, you're gonna find that much more free. I mean, when when it talks about the arm of the Lord or the horn of the Lord or something like that, however, you'd be surprised how many people still. I mean, it's a smaller subset, but there's a lot of people who will still try to I mean, I've heard it come up to me and say, No, God has a body look, it says the arm of the Lord, he has an arm. You know, so that's the thing I definitely hear. But you know, way less common than literal illness in other areas. You know, you know,

Trevor Adams 55:32

where I do hear this actually a lot is God's pronouns. Gotta be a healing. Gotta be a he, God's a he, God's a him. Right. Like, that's when I do start to hear people lean on. Something like, well, you know, the male spirit is really most like the spirit. I mean, maybe it's still analogical you know, the sets, because there'll be like, of course, God's not. God doesn't have a body, you know, maybe if they've, if they've thought that through, but the I have this crop up in that discussion.

Charles Kim 56:12

So the way that liberals get away with doing it, so we are just describing evangelical congregations. So just, I got my master's degree with the liberals at Princeton seminary. And the way that liberals get away with it is they say, What did the Hebrew author who wrote the text think that they meant, and then they will always say it's literal. And so they they make the exact same move, but they asked you to sort of, don't read this as if it applies to you read this from their point of view. And they are, and they won't call it a univocal speech are not literal speech. But that's

Tom Velasco 56:53

chronological snobbery. And I can so sick of hearing moderns act like ancients didn't understand what metaphor was like, it drives me nuts when people sit there and say, Oh, no, the Greeks they all just believe that the stories they told about Zeus and Europa, nevermind the fact that that there are actually super interesting metaphors there. They totally just accepted it as completely literal. Because people were incapable of thinking of metaphor until the 20th century. I mean, drives me nuts. I mean, I don't know I can't say that you didn't have ancients? Who didn't? I'm sure at times, you had plenty who thought in literal terms? And probably, maybe the masses did maybe the uneducated masses who never read anything. When they went to a temple and heard something about Zeus. Maybe they really did think those stories were real, but guaranteed like I mean, when you when educated people, they were thinking ontologically, all the time, Homer is not literal. That guy is is full of metaphor, and analogy. And everything represents something I mean, to a very, like, I mean, I mean, I just think about it just as an example, think of the Odyssey. The Odyssey opens with Odysseus on the island of Calypso. What is Calypso? Calypso is a goddess, but And what does she want? She's in love with Odysseus show. So he's her sex slave, and she's keeping him there and he can't escape. But at the end of the day, what does Calypso mean? It means hidden, it means hidden. And what is Odysseus? He's hidden, he can't be found. And that sets the whole energy of the opening of the book when his son goes out to search for his last father, right? I mean, it's like it's full of all sorts of metaphors that were never meant to be interpreted as real or literal. And I don't know when I read, like, there are times when I read passages in the Old Testament, and I think, oh, that does sound literal. Like it does sound like they're being literal. But honestly, most of the time, I don't think it does, especially when you're talking about some like the the language of the Psalms and talking about the arm of the Lord and things of that. I'm not picturing. I'm not when I read that. I don't think they're picturing an arm. You know? That's,

Trevor Adams 59:10

or God being like a mother hen gathering us under her wings. Yeah. Yeah. What would that mean? If that was univocal? Yeah, there's like, yeah, like hens, by the way, are fierce for those who think they're not. They can be

Charles Kim 59:30

I have seven of them now.

Trevor Adams 59:32

Oh, so you know? Yeah. Fun, like Yeah, it's, it's, it's, it's fun to bring it up when it's obvious. And then when, whenever it's your particular theological importance thing to you, then you'll you'll defend a more univocal view or something. Of course, this comes up in Transubstantiation arguments as well. This is like the whole thing. fight right so maybe we'll talk about that someday as well but

Charles Kim 1:00:04

thanks for listening to history of Christian theology My name is Chad Kim we'll be back next time with another author interview probably Dr Tran will be next up on the docket thanks for listening See you next time

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